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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in this matter is 
found in Section 78-2-2-2 (3) (3) (ii), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. Pursuant to Rule 14, Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Petition for Writ of Review from the final decision of 
the above-referenced matter of the Tax Commission of Utah: R.H. 
Hansen, Chairman, has been properly filed within the time 
required by Rule 14(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
No other claims remain to be determined in these proceedings and 
appeal is taken to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from the formal Decision of the State 
Tax Commission of Utah wherein said Commission granted a 
property tax preference to Kennecott Corporation and reduced the 
value of 3,990 acres of property owned by Kennecott to its value 
for agricultural purposes. The property was leased to Hercules, 
Inc., for a buffer zone around its manufacturing plant and was 
also leased for grazing and for the growing of red winter wheat. 
The Tax Commission decision was issued on September 10, 1987. 
Petition for Writ of Review was filed bv appellant, Salt Lake 
County, on October 8, 1987. Writ of Review was issued by the 
Supreme Court on October 8, 198 7. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the use of the subject property in the 
manner set forth in the lease between Kennecott Corporation and 
Hercules Corporation in conjunction with its rocket and muni-
tions manufacturing plant and used as a buffer zone with regard 
to said plant, allows said property to be assessed as agricul-
tural property by virtue of the fact that said property is also 
leased for use as grazing and ground to grow red winter wheat. 
2. Whether or not assessment of property under the 
Farmland Assessment Act is a limited tax exemption and should be 
narrowly construed. 
3. Whether or not Utah Code Annotated Section 59-13-73 
(now 59-4-101) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1987, is 
applicable if the Tax Commission assessment as farmland is 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Salt Lake County, during tax year 1985, 
assessed the property that is the subject matter of this appeal. 
Subject property consists of approximately 3,990 acres surround-
ing a munitions and rocket motor manufacturing plant being 
constructed by Hercules. The subject property is leased to 
Hercules by Kennecott as a buffer zone, required by Federal and 
State law. Of that acreage, Petitioner also leases approximate-
ly 1,500 acres to Don Rushton who grows red winter wheat on the 
property, and leases the remainder of the subject property plus 
several thousand other acres to Johnson Cattle Company, which 
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raises cattle on the property. The Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization determined that the property that was leased to 
Hercules Corporation and used in conjunction with the munitions 
manufacturing and rocket motor manufacturing facility was not 
subject to assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act, but was 
rather subject to assessment at fair market value as is all 
other tangible property located within the State of Utah. 
Thereafter, Kennecott Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal to 
the Utah State Tax Commission. The Utah State Tax Commission, 
on the 3rd day of September, 1986, issued an informal decision 
wherein it determined that the subject land was actively devoted 
to agricultural use including the grazing of beef cattle and the 
growing of grain crops, and that as such, the land was subject 
to valuation under the Farmland Assessment Act, pursuant to 
Section 59-5-90, Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, as amended. The 
Commission further determined that Hercules1 rights to the 
subject property, under its lease with Kennecott, and the use 
thereof by Hercules did not preclude assessment of the subject 
property under the provisions of the Farmland Assessment Act. 
Petitioner, Salt Lake County, filed a Petition for a Formal 
Hearing, which hearing was held on the 30th of December, 1986. 
Thereafter, on the 10th day of September, 1987, the Utah State 
Tax Commission issued its Formal Decision determining that the 
subject property should be valued as land qualifying for assess-
ment under the Farmland Assessment Act, and directed the Salt 
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Lake County Assessor to assess the property devoted to agricul-
tural use and to continue assessing said property under the 
Farmland Assessment Act until and unless the subject property 
fails to meet any of the requirements of the Act. Petitioner 
thereafter filed a Petition for a Writ of Review v/hich Petition 
and Writ were filed and issued on the 8th day of October, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The property that is the subject of this appeal is 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and owned by Kennecott 
Corporation and leased to Hercules, Inc. 
The subject property consists of approximately 3,990 
acres surrounding a manufacturing plant constructed by Hercules, 
Inc., where products such as rocket fuels and motors are man-
ufactured and where experiments may occur on other potentially 
explosive materials. (T-605-642) . Because of the dangerous and 
potentially explosive activities which are carried on at the 
Hercules facility, federal, state and local laws require a 
buffer zone around the Hercules facility where there may be no 
other human habitation or human activities because of the 
potential risk to human life and safety. (T-359-541) . There-
fore, Hercules, Inc., has entered into a 25 year lease of the 
Kennecott property to provide the required buffer zone. 
(T-605-642). In addition, Kennecott has also leased portions of 
the same property to two separate farmers, Johnson and Rushton, 
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on two separate agricultural leases. (T-346-353) and 
(T-587-590) . One for grazing and the other for the growing of 
red winter wheat. A comparison of the relevant provisions of 
the three leases is as follows: 
RUSHTON JOHNSON HERCULES 
LEASE LEASE LEASE 
Term of Lease: 1 year 1 year 2 5 years 
Renewal Options: 1 year 1 year 15 years 
Renewal at Option of: Kennecott Kennecott Hercules 
Total Term which 
Lessee Can Mandate: 1 year 1 year 40 years 
Right of First 
Refusal: No No Yes 
Annual Lease 
Agreement: 25% of Gross $4,500. $239,640.* 
Termination Notice 30 days 30 days None for 
by Lessor: 40 years 
* Plus annual adjustment based upon fluctuations in GNPPD. 
Additionally, Hercules1 rights under its lease with 
Kennecott entitles Hercules the right to prevent Kennecott from 
leasing or selling the property to a party who would build a 
habitable structure on the property. (T-623-624). 
The Tax Commission, on the 10th day of September, 
1987, issued its formal decision and determined that the subject 
property was land qualified to be assessed under the Farmland 
Assessment Act, as property devoted to agricultural use. The 
Commission further directed the Salt Lake County Assessor to 
assess the property as property devoted to agricultural use, and 
5 
to continue assessing the property under the Farmland Assessment 
Act until and unless the subject property fails to meet any of 
the qualifications under the Farmland Assessment Act. 
(T-44-52). 
Petitioner, Salt Lake County filed its petition for a 
Writ of Review on the 8th day of October, 1987. (T-4-"7) . Said 
Writ of Review was duly issued to the Clerk of this Court on 
October 8, 1987. (T-l-3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The property owned by Kennecott Corporation and leased 
to Hercules Corporation to facilitate the manufacturing of 
rocket motors, fuels, and munitions, and upon which experiments 
may occur on other potentially explosive materials which, by 
Federal, State and local law is required to be maintained as a 
buffer zone where there may be no other human habitation or 
human activities because of the potential risk to human life and 
safety, is not property qualified for preferential tax treatment 
afforded under the Farmland Assessment Act which requires, as a 
condition of such treatment that such property be "actively 
devoted to agricultural use." Therefore, said property should 
be denied preferential tax assessment and should bear its fair 
share of the tax burden and be assessed in the same manner as 
other taxable property located within Salt Lake County. And, to 
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the extent the value and tax is exempted, the users thereof 
should pay the privilege tax therefore. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPROXIMATELY 400 0 ACRES OF LAND LEASED 
BY KENNECOTT TO HERCULES, INC., IS NOT "LAND 
WHICH IS ACTIVELY DEMOTED TO AGRICULTURAL 
USE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH FARMLAND 
ASSESSMENT ACT. 
Section 59-5-89 (now 59-2-503), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, reads, in part, as follows: 
"Value of Land actively devoted to agricultural use. 
(1) For general property tax purposes and land subject 
to the privilege tax imposed by section 59-13-73 owned 
by the state or any political subdivision thereof, the 
value of land, not less than five contiguous acres in 
area, unless otherwise provided under subsection (2), 
which has a gross income, not including rental income, 
of $1000 per year, is actively devoted to agricultural 
use, which has been so devoted for at least two 
successive years immediately preceding the tax year in 
issue, shall, on application of that owner, and 
approval thereof as hereinafter provided, be that 
value which such land has for agricultural use. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
However, as a threshold requirement, the land for which the 
preferential tax treatment is sought must be "actively devoted 
to agricultural use." (Emphasis supplied.) Appellants assert 
that the Kennecott-Hercules rocket and explosives buffer zone 
that is the subject of this appeal fails to meet this threshold 
requirement. 
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This is a case of first impression in that there are 
no other Utah cases that have interpreted the statutory language 
of "actively devoted to agricultural use." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines 
"devoted" as, "To commit by solemn act," or "to give over or 
direct to a cause, enterprise or activity." It lists the words 
"dedicate" and "consecrate" as synonyms and then indicates that 
the word "Dedicate" implies solemn and exclusive devotion to a 
sacred or serious use or purpose. (Emphasis supplied.) It is 
therefore respectfully submitted that the phrase "actively 
devoted for agricultural use" as used by the Utah State Legisla-
ture signifies an intent on the part of the Legislature to 
require that the tax preference be extended only to those lands 
that are used nearly exclusively for agricultural purposes. A 
de minimus non-agricultural use should not disqualify the 
property from the preferential treatment. The facts in this 
case clearly demonstrate that the non-agricultural use is 
dominant rather than de minimus. The use of the property in 
this case is as a buffer zone for the Hercules rocket manufac-
turing facility and related Hercules activities. Its primary or 
dominant or exclusive use is industrial. To build its plant, 
Hercules needed a buffer zone. Its plant could not exist 
without it. Federal, state and local laws would not allow the 
plant to exist without the buffer zone. The use is demonstrated 
by the lease comparison set forth in the statement of facts. 
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The rents received from the Rushton and Johnson agricultural 
leases are less than five (5) percent of the rents received for 
the Hercules industrial lease. Rushton1s rent is twenty-five 
(25) percent of gross production of red winter wheat. Pent from 
the Johnson lease is $4,500. per year. The Hercules lease base 
rent is $239,640. per year. Hercules annual base rent is 5,333% 
higher than the rent received on the Johnson lease. The base 
rent of the Hercules lease is adjusted each July based upon 
fluctuations in the Gross National Product Price Deflation over 
the base year of 1982. In addition, Hercules pays all taxes and 
assessments upon the property. The length of time that the 
agricultural leases can be mandated is less than three (3) 
percent of the time that the Hercules industrial lease can be 
mandated. 
The lessor, Kennecott Corporation, can terminate the 
Johnson lease upon thirty (30) days notice. Kennecott Corpo-
ration can terminate the Rushton lease upon thirty (30) days 
written notice. Kennecott cannot terminate the Hercules Indus-
trial lease for forty (40) years. The Johnson and Rushton 
leases are renewable each year only if Kennecott is willing to 
renew them. On the other hand, Kennecott must renew the 
Hercules industrial lease for forty (40) years if Hercules 
elects to renew it. Given the above facts, it is clear that the 
subject property is actively devoted to an industrial use rather 
than an agricultural use. 
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This Court in Loyal Order of Moose, #259 -vs- County 
Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d (Utah 1982), 
addressed the issue of whether certain property owned by the 
Moose Lodge in Salt Lake City was used exclusively for charita-
ble purposes. In denying the exemption, the Court made the 
following significant statements v/hich are equally applicable to 
this case. The Court therein at page 263 stated: 
"Fe see wisdom in a rule which does not deny a tax 
exemption to property which is used for charitable 
purposes simply because there is a de minimus non-
charitable use. The exemption need not be interpreted 
as the law of the Medes and Persians. The intent of 
Section 2, Article XIII to encourage charity is 
preserved where inadvertent or extremely minor non-
charitable uses of property do not foreclose an 
exemption. However, where the non-charitable use 
rises to the level that it must be weighed against 
charitable use in order to determine which use is 
dominant, then clearly the non-charitable use is well 
beyond the point of de minimus and should unques-
tionably preclude an exemption. (Emphasis added.) 
On page 264 of that case the Court continued: 
The constitutional exemption is to be strictly con-
strued and the charitable use of the property must be 
exclusive; however, a use of true minor import or a de 
minimus use will not defeat an exemption. If there is 
any separate part of the building occupied and used 
exclusively for charitable purposes, that part qual-
ified for exemption. (Emphasis added.) 
******* *** 
Therefore, under the rule that the charitable use must 
be exclusive (previously explained in Part III of this 
option), whether the non-charitable use was primary or 
not primary is not the test. Clearly, the non-
charitable use was not de minimus and the property 
does not qualify for an exemption. (Emphasis added.) 
10 
While it might be argued that the constitutional 
requirement of "used exclusively for" is narrower than the 
statutory requirement of being "actively devoted to agricultural 
use." the same reasoning is applicable. An exemption from 
taxation or a substantial reduction such as given for agricul-
tural use is a tax preference. The rules requiring strict and 
narrow construction of tax exemption statutes should be equally 
applicable to a substantial reduction in tax burden. Both 
reduce government revenues and both result in an increased 
burden upon the already over-burdened taxpayers. To qualify for 
preferential assessment as agricultural land, the land must be 
"actively devoted to agricultural use." This would allow a de 
minimus non-agricultural use to occur without endangering the 
tax preference so long as the agricultural use was primary, 
dominant or nearly exclusive. Under this test, the Kennecott 
property leased to Hercules does not qualify. At best, the 
agricultural use is de minimus or secondary. Its dominate or 
devoted use is industrial. To impose a requirement that the 
agricultural use of property must be primary, dominant or nearly 
exclusive is consistent with the Utah cases dealing with proper-
ty tax exemptions extended to religious and charitable prop-
erties under the Utah Constitution. These exemptions are 
strictly construed in favor of taxation and against exemption. 
See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 
1985). It is also consistent with the position taken earlier by 
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the Utah State Tax Commission in Judd v. County Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, Decision of Informal Hearing, 
Appeals No. 85-1^38 thru 85-1750, decided April 2, 1986, 
appended hereto as Addendum 2, wherein the Commission on page 3 
thereof, ruled in part as follows: 
"Once property has been severed, subdivided, and 
improvements placed thereon, the greenbelt status 
should be removed and roll-back taxes assessed accord-
ing to statute because the primary purpose of the 
ground is no longer for agricultural use, but for 
resale." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The primary purpose of the ground used by Hercules, 
Inc., and leased from Kennecott is industrial. It is a buffer 
zone. Additionally, this reasoning is consistent with the 
decisions of other courts confronting the interpretation of 
similar language in statutes. 
In the case of Rushton Hospital, Inc., -vs- Riser, 191 
So. 2d 665, (La. 1966), the Louisiana Constitution exempted from 
taxation "places devoted to charitable undertakings." The 
Louisiana Court of Appeals held that it was the use of the 
property that constituted the test, and that the term "devoted 
to" connotates a setting apart, a dedication. Based upon the 
constitutional requirement of "devoted to" the Court held that: 
"There must be evidence which establishes the 
fact that the operation and use of the undertaking is 
devoted exclusively to the performance of charitable 
acts." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Otis Lodge, Inc., -vs- Commissioner of 
Taxation, 206 N.W. 2d 3, (Minn. 1972), the Minnesota Supreme 
12 
Court dealt with a statute that taxes property at a lower rate 
(Class 3) if it was "devoted to temporary and seasonal residen-
tial occupancy for recreational purposes." The court therein, 
at page 7, stated: 
"Perhaps some attention should be given to the 
use of the word "devoted" in the phrase we are inter-
preting. Does it mean, as used here, given "wholly 
and completely" or "chiefly" to "seasonal residential 
occupancy for recreational purposes?" Suppose the 
owner of a non-commercial cottage uses it between 
seasons for a few weekends to "get away from it all" 
and not because of any particular recreational activi-
ty that could be termed seasonal. Should this minimum 
use be grounds for denying that owner's real estate a 
class 3 status? We think that the word "devoted means 
chiefly and not wholly because we don't think the 
legislature intended an absurd result. Furthermore, 
the phrase "devoted to" clearly means the use to which 
it is actually put, not the use or uses to which the 
property may be put. (Emphasis added.) 
In another Minnesota case involving the same statute 
that was involved in the Otis Lodge case, supra, Wolf Lake Camp, 
Inc., v. County of Itasca, 252 N.W. 2d 261, (Minn. 1977), the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that under the statute using the 
term "devoted to" "the actual use of the real property must be 
chiefly for" the use to which it must be devoted under the 
statute. The reasoning in Otis has been cited with approval by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Complaint of McLinn, 744 F.2d 677 (C.A. 9th 1984). See also, 
Helgeson v. County of Hennepin, 387 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1986) . 
The most comparable case is City of East Orange v. 
Township of Livingston, 246 A. 2d 178, (N.J. 1968), where the 
Superior Court of New Jersey was faced with a Farmland 
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Assessment statute nearly identical to the Utah statute. The 
New Jersey statutes were part of their Farmland Assessment Act 
of 1964, and provided as follows: 
"For general property tax purposes, the value of land, 
not less than 5 acres in area, which is actively 
devoted to agricultural or horticultural use which has 
been so devoted for at lease the two successive years 
immediately preceding the tax year in issue, shall, on 
application of the owner, the approval thereof as 
hereinafter provided, be that value which such land 
has for agricultural or horticultural use." N.J.S.A. 
54:4-23.2 (Emphasis added.) 
"Land shall be deemed to be in agricultural use 
when devoted to the production for sale of plants and 
animals useful to man including but not limited to: 
forages and sod crops; grains and feed crops; dairy 
animals and dairy products; poultry and poultry 
products; livestock, including beef cattle, sheep, 
swine, horses, ponies, mules or goats, including the 
breeding and grazing of any or all of such animals; 
bees and apiary products; fur animals; trees and 
forest products; or when devoted to and meeting the 
requirements and qualifications for payments or other 
compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program 
under an agreement with an agency of the Federal 
Government." N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.3 
Land shall be deemed to be actively devoted to 
agricultural or horticultural use when the gross sales 
of agricultural or horticultural products produced 
thereon together with any payments received under a 
soil conservation program have averaged at least 
$500.00 per year during the 2-year period immediately 
preceding the tax year in issue, or there is clear 
evidence of anticipated yearly gross sales and such 
payments amounting to at least $500.00 within a 
reasonable period of time." N.J.S.A 54:4-23.5 
The land in question in that case was used primarily 
as a Water Reserve and secondarily as agricultural property. 
The contention of the property owner was: 
The water Reserve is said to be "in agricultural use" 
within the meaning of the act because it consists of 
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pastureland and is used for the growing and sale of 
hay, timber and cordwood from which East Orange 
derives an annual income in excess of the statutory 
minimum. It also is asserted tangentially that the 
Water Reserve is entitled to farmland assessment 
because it is under a federal soil conservation 
program. 
The Court therein stated that: 
"The purpose of [The Farmland Assessment Act of 1964] 
was to counter the adverse impact of property taxation 
upon agriculture and to provide farmers with some 
measure of tax relief." 
Further, at page 189-190: 
It was apparent that the main objective of the 
proposed amendment was to enable and encourage farmers 
to continue to farm their land in the face of dwindl-
ing farm incomes and mounting costs, not the least of 
which was sharply increasing real estate taxes. 
Senate Committee on Revision and Amendment of Laws, 
Public Hearing, "Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 16, 
etc." (April 15, 1963). There were also other 
incidental, beneficent purposes anticipated by its 
proponents, such as fostering agriculture in the State 
for the good of the general economy, ameliorating 
problems of urban growth in rural municipalities, and 
encouraging the preservation of open spaces. Id., pp. 
5, 11-13, 16, 33-35. But, as noted, the primary 
objective was to save the "family farm" and to provide 
farmers with some economic relief by permitting 
farmlands to be taxed upon their value as on-going 
farms and not on any other basis. 
The relevant portions of the holding are then stated 
at page 191 of the decision, wherein it is stated: 
Moreover, even if a municipal watershed were 
within the ambit of the Farmland Assessment Act of 
1964, the agricultural activities undertaken on the 
East Orange Water Reserve would not qualify these 
lands for taxation as farmlands. The pointed inquiry 
on this hypothesis is whether, by virtue of the 
activities relating to the sales of hay, timber and 
cordwood, it can be said that the East Orange Water 
Reserve is "actively devoted" to "agricultural use" 
within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.5. Even though 
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the agricultural use is "active" in the literal sense 
that East Orange has realized income in excess of $500 
per annum for the past two years from the sale of 
timber, cordwood and hay (N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.5), compli-
ance with this single criterion does not per se render 
the Water reserve as land "devoted" to agricultural 
use. To be "in agricultural use" under the act, land 
must actually be "devoted to the production for sale 
of plants * * * useful to man, including but not 
limited to * * * trees and forest products * * *.." 
It may be accepted that trees and forest products are 
a derivative of the East Orange Water Reserve. It 
does not follow therefrom that the East Orange Water 
Reserve is devoted to the production for sale of its 
trees and forest products. 
* * * * * 
In brief, the term "devote" must be understood in 
its usual significance and in a manner which will 
sensibly effectuate the salient statutory objective of 
providing tax relief with respect to lands committed 
to farming. 
The verb "devote" denotes variously "1, * * * to 
set apart or dedicate by a solemn act; to consecrate; 
* * * 2. to give up wholly; to addict; to direct the 
attention of wholly or chiefly." A synonym is "to set 
apart" or "to appropriate," An equivalent verb is "to 
dedicate," Webster's New International Dictionary 
(1948 ed.), 715. 
All of the experts recognize that there can be 
multiple uses of woodlands or forests, which could 
include or combine the production o^ water, wood, 
recreation, education and the like. Depending upon 
the particular lands involved, one use tends to become 
dominant. The principal use of the East Orange Water 
Reserve is a watershed. Any commercial gain from the 
sale of hay, timber or wood is merely an incidental 
by-product of the maintenance of the Water Reserve 
woodlands. The management of the forest, including 
the planting, harvest and removal of trees, is for the 
essential purpose of encouraging the recharge and 
replenishment of the under-ground wells. As far as 
the state program is concerned, the cutting plan for 
trees is not for the purpose of producing lumber 
commercially but with a view towards the primary use 
of lands as a watershed. Consequently, from any 
vantage point, the agricultural uses of the Water 
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Reserve must be regarded as subservient to its domi-
nant use as a public water supply. In no sense, 
therefore, can it be said that the East Orange Water 
Reserve is devoted, that is, committed, or dedicated, 
or set apart or appropriated, or given up wholly or 
chiefly to the production for sale of agricultural 
products of any kind within the meaning of the Farm-
land Assessment Act of 1964. To the contrary, it is 
devoted to the purpose for which it was originally 
acquired by East Orange, namely, for the purpose and 
the protection of a public water SUDDIV. (Emphasis 
added,). 
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products" of any kind within the meaning of the Farmland Assess-
ment Act. " 
In addition, even though it is acknowledged that the 
agricultural use of Kennecott's land is active use and that it 
meets the minimum income requirements, that does not per se 
render the land as "devoted to agricultural use." In this case, 
the chief, dominant and primary use of the land is the Hercules 
industrial lease. The agricultural leases are so secondary and 
incidental as to only be a de minimus use of the property. The 
land is devoted to, dedicated to, committed to, given over to, 
and consecrated to the Hercules lease and not the agricultural 
leases. 
Florida, a state with much agriculture and much real 
estate development has enacted a tax preference in favor of 
agricultural use. "The purpose of the agricultural tax prefer-
ence was based upon the legislative determination that agricul-
ture cannot reasonably be expected to withstand the tax burden 
of the highest and best use to which such land might be put." 
See Straughn v. E.K. Land Management, Inc., 326 So.2d 421, (Fla. 
1976) at page 424. 
In Florida, agricultural use is ascertained with 
reference to the amount of money that could be invested with a 
reasonable expectation of an annual return to the owner similar 
to what he would gain from other commercial enterprises with 
similar risks, liquidity, degree and level of management. How 
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does the $239,640,000. annual base rent from Hercules, Inc., for 
a buffer zone compare to the $4,500. annual rent received from 
Johnson? The Hercules industrial rent is over 5000% more per 
year than the Johnson agricultural rent. Could Kennecott 
reasonably expect to receive $239,640,000. per year from grazing 
or from growing wheat? 
In Markham v. Nationwide Development, 349 So.2d 220 
(Fla. 1977), the property owner sued to overturn the assessor's 
determination that its property was not agricultural land for 
purposes of tax preference. Under Florida law there is a 
statutory presumption that a sale of land for a purchase price 
that is three or more times its agricultural assessment creates 
a presumption that the land is not used primarily for bona fide 
agricultural purposes. In sustaining the assessor's 
determination to deny tax preference the District Court of 
Appeals observed at page 222 as follows: "Even without the 
statutory presumption of Section 193.461 (4) (c), the facts of 
this case justify the Property Appraiserfs denial of 
Nationwidefs application for agricultural classification." 
* * * * * 
"Good faith commercial agricultural use of the land 
requires more than mere agricultural use. First 
National Bank of Hollywood v. Markham, 342 So.2d 1016 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1977). To be a good faith commercial 
agricultural use, there must be at least a reasonable 
expectation of meeting investment lost and realizing a 
reasonable profit." 
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In North Carolina the agricultural tax preference is 
based upon present use. In ascertaining present use of the 
land, the focus is also upon the owner and its source of income. 
In W.R. Co. v. North Carolina Property Tax Commission, 269 
S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1980)
 f the only sources of income the property 
owner had was from the sale of real estate, agricultural rents 
for lands and allotments, and for one year only, the sale of 
crops. The Court denied the preferential tax treatment because 
as a corporation, the owner failed to meet the definition of a 
qualifying corporation for "present use" valuation purposes. In 
looking at the source of income of the corporation, the Court 
concluded that the farm-related income constituted only a minor 
fraction of the corporation's total income and therefore denied 
the tax preference. Admittedly, the test in Utah focuses upon 
the use of the property. However, the manner in which the 
corporation is chartered gives insight into how it uses its 
property to derive its income. Kennecott is a mining company. 
It makes its money recovering gold, silver, copper and other 
minerals. It also makes money from renting the surface of 
mining properties such as those rented to Hercules. There is no 
evidence in the record to show it derives its income from 
agriculture. In W.R. Co., the Court reviewed statutes granting 
preferential treatment in 35 other states. It also reviewed 
several law review articles and at page 643 of the opinion made 
the following helpful observations: 
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"It is an unfair subsidization of farmers and land 
speculators who are not in need of tax shelter. See 
Carman & Poison, Tax Shifts Occurring as a Result of 
Differential Assessment of Farmland: California, 
1968-69, Nat'l Tax. J. 449, 455 (1970). Second, the 
use valuation method does not really preserve prime 
agricultural land near urban cities for any great 
length of time but instead extends development specu-
lation for a short period of time. Henke, Supra, at 
123-24. Third, the tax base is reduced placing an 
undue burden on those holding nonagricultural land to 
make up the deficit, and the tax penalties and recap-
tures on sale in effect benefit a land speculator who 
can use them to reduce his ordinary income and 
capitals gains from sale in the year in which he makes 
the sale." 
How does the property owned by Kennecott and leased to 
Hercules promote and preserve farming. Is a commercial, long-
term, industrial lease with adjustments based upon the Gross 
National Product Production the use that the Legislature had in 
mind? Absolutely not. This is abuse that does violence to the 
intent of the people of the State of Utah when they approved the 
constitutional amendment to allow preferential assessment for 
farmland, and contrary to the intent of the legislature when it 
sought to implement the constitutional provision. This Court 
should not perpetuate the abuse of the tax preference given to 
legitimate farming enterprise. The preference given Kennecott 
and Hercules by the Tax Commission should be reversed and set 
aside. 
POINT II 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FULL VALUE ASSESSMENT 
AND THE PREFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT GIVEN TO 
QUALIFYING FARM LAND CONSTITUTES AN 
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EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION AND THE USE OF SUCH 
EXEMPT PROPERTY IN THIS CASE IS SUBJECT TO 
THE PRIVILEGE TAX. 
Section 59-13-73 (now 59-4-101) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 1987, provides in part as follows: "(1) A tax 
is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by 
any person of any real or personal property which for any reason 
is exempt from taxation, if that property is used in connection 
with a business for profit." Therefore, to be subject to the 
privilege tax, the following requirements are necessary: 
(1) Real or personal property; 
(2) Possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any 
person of any real or personal property; 
(3) The property is exempt for any reason; 
(4) Used in connection with a business for profit. 
If Kennecottfs real property is assessed at its 
farmland value, then the difference between what it would have 
been assessed (full value assessment), based upon highest and 
best use, and the preferential assessment (farmland assessment), 
is an exemption from taxation. Since Hercules, Rushton and 
Johnson are each engaged in business for profit, the privilege 
tax would apply and they should be required to pay their propor-
tionate share based upon their use of the exempted portion of 
Kennecottf s property. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has an opportunity to prevent what could 
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become a very abusive use of the Farmland Assessment Act. That 
Act was passed with a specific purpose. The purpose was to 
preserve the opportunity for true agricultural users who were 
actively engaged in agriculture to use the land for that purpose 
without having the tax climate impact them to the point where 
they could no longer afford to continue farming. The assessment 
as farmland constitutes a tax preference and just as the prefer-
ence given to religions and charitable properties in Utah, it 
should be strictly construed. To expand it to include the 
Kennecott-Hercules industrial lease for the next 25 or 40 years 
would be in complete derogation of what the people voted for 
when they approved the amendments to Section 3 of Article XIII, 
of the Utah Constitution. kennecott Corporation through 
Hercules should not be allowed to abuse that intention. 
The decision of the Tax Commission of U+-ah should be 
reversed in its entirety and Salt Lake County should be allowed 
to assess the subject property in the same manner as all other 
taxable property in Salt Lake County that is not actively 
devoted to agricultural use. 
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ARTICLE XIII. REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Sec. 1. [Fiscal year.] 
The fiscal year shall begin on the first day of 
January, unless changed by the Legislature. 
1896 
Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value 
ascertained — Exemption of state and 
municipal property — Exemption of tangible 
personal property held for sale or processing — 
Exemption of property used for irrigating land 
— Exemption of property used for electrical 
power — Remittance or abatement of taxes of 
poor — Exemption of residential and household 
property — Disabled veterans' exemption — 
Intangible property — Legislature to provide 
annual tax for state.] 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under this 
Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as 
provided by law. 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and 
public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special 
districts, and all other political subdivisions of the 
state, except that to the extent and in the manner 
provided by the Legislature the property of a county, 
city, town, special district or other political subdivision 
of the state located outside of its geographic boundaries 
as defined by law may be subject to the ad valorem 
property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is 
used exclusively for religious, charitable or educa-
tional purposes; 
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or 
corporate benefit; and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined 
by statute. This exemption shall be implemented over 
a period of time as provided by statute. 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on 
January 1, m., which is held for sale or processing and 
which is shipped to final destination outside this state 
within twelve months may be deemed by law to have 
acquired no situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem 
property taxation and may be exempted by law from 
such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or 
produced or otherwise originating within or without 
the state. 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on 
January 1, m., held for sale in the ordinary course of 
business and which constitutes the inventory of any 
retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or 
livestock raiser may be deemed for purposes of ad 
valorem property taxation to be exempted. 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power 
plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes and 
flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations 
for irrigating land within the state owned by such 
individuals or corporations, or the individual members 
thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the extent 
that they shall be owned and used for such purposes. 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other 
property used for generating and delivering electrical 
power, a portion of which is used for furnishing power 
for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in 
the state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to 
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the extent that such property is used for such purposes. 
These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the 
users of water so pumped under such regulations as 
the Legislature may prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at 
such times and in such manner as may be provided by 
law. 
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the 
exemption from taxation, of not to exceed 45% of the 
fair market value of residential property as defined by 
law, and all household furnishings, furniture, and 
equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at 
his place of abode m maintaining a home for himself 
and family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served 
in any war m the military service of the United States 
or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried widows 
and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of 
persons who while serving in the military service of 
the United States or the state of Utah were killed in 
action or died as a result of such service may be 
exempted as the Legislature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from 
taxation as property or it may be taxed as property in 
such manner and to such extent as the Legislature may 
provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom 
shall not also be taxed. Provided that if intangible 
property is taxed as property the rate thereof shall not 
exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation 
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an 
annual tax sufficient, with other sources of revenue, to 
defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the state for 
each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state 
debt, if any there be, the Legislature shall provide for 
levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay the annual 
mterest and to pay the principal of such debt, within 
twenty years from the final passage of the law creating 
the debt. 
January 1,1931 





January 1, 1983 
Sea 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property 
— Livestock — Land used for agricultural 
purposes.] 
(l)The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property 
in the state, according to its value in money, except as 
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The 
Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such 
property, so that every person and corporation shall 
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its 
tangible property, provided that the Legislature may 
determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock. 
(2)Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the 
Legislature prescribes, be assessed according to its 
value for agricultural use without regard to the value it 








59-2-501. Revenue and Taxation UTAH CODE 1987-198$ 
59-2-515. Rules prescribed by commission. 
59-2-501. Short title. 
This part is known as theTarmiand Assessment 
A c t . "
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59-2-502. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Land in agricultural use" means: 
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful plants 
and animals, such as: 
(i) forages and sod crops; 
(ii) grains and feed crops; 
(iii) livestock as defined in Subsection 59-2-
102(8)(d); 
(iv) trees and fruits; or 
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and orname-
ntal stock; or 
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirem-
ents and qualifications for payments or other com-
pensation under a crop-land retirement program 
with an agency of the state or federal government. 
(2) "Roll-back" means the period preceding the 
withdrawal of the land from the provisions of this 
part or the change in use of the land, not to exceed 
five years, during which the land is valued, assessed, 
and taxed under this part. 1987 
59-2-503. Qualifications for agricultural use 
valuation. 
(1) For general property tax purposes, the value 
of land under this part is the value which the land 
has for agricultural use if the land: 
(a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area, 
except where devoted to agricultural use in conjun-
ction with other eligible acreage or as provided 
under Subsection (3); 
(b) has a gross income from agricultural use, 
not including rental income, of at least $1000 per 
year; 
(c) is actively devoted to agricultural use; and 
(d) has been devoted to agricultural use for at 
least two successive years immediately preceding the 
tax year in issue. 
(2) Land which (a) is subject to the privilege tax 
imposed by Section 59-4-101, (b) is owned by the 
state or any of its political subdivisions, and (c) 
meets the requirements of Subsection (1), is eligible 
for assessment based on its agricultural value. 
(3) The commission may grant a waiver of the 
acreage limitation, upon appeal by the owner and 
submission of proof that 80% or more of the 
owner's, purchaser's, or lessee's income is derived 
from agricultural products produced on the property 
in question. 
(4)(a) The commission may grant a waiver of the 
income limitation for the tax year in issue, upon 
appeal by the owner and submission of proof that 
the land was valued on the basis of agricultural use 
for at least two years immediately preceding that tax 
year, and that the failure to meet the income requ-
irements for that tax year was due to no fault or act 
of the owner, purchaser, or lessee. 
(b) As used in this section, "fault" does not 
include the intentional planting of crops or trees 
which, because of the maturation period, do not 
give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a reasonable 
opportunity to satisfy the income requirement. im 
59-2-504. Application requirements - Change in 
land use or withdrawal. 
(1) The owner of land eligible for valuation under 
this part shall submit an application to the county 
assessor of the county in which the land is located. 
Applications shall be accepted if filed prior to 
March 1 of the tax year in which valuation under| 
this part is first requested. Any application submi. 
tted after January 1 is subject to a $25 late filing] 
fee. Filing fees shall be paid to the county treasurer 
at the time the application is filed. AH applications 
filed under this subsection shall be recorded by the] 
county recorder. 
(2) Once valuation under this part has been app 
roved, the owner is not required either to file again! 
or give any notice to the county assessor, until a) 
change in the land use occurs. Failure of the owner! 
to notify the county assessor and pay the roll-back! 
tax imposed by Section 59-2-506 within 90 days| 
after any change in land use subjects the owner to 
penalty of lOOVo of the roll-back tax due. 
(3) Any change in land use or other withdrawal oi 
land from the provisions of this part subjects thcj 
land to the roll-back tax whether the change orj 
withdrawal is voluntary or involuntary, unless thej 
change in use or other withdrawal is due to ineligi 
bility resulting solely from amendments to this part. 
(4) Land which becomes exempt from taxation! 
under Article XIII, Sec. 2, Utah Constitution, is not! 
considered withdrawn from this part if the landl 
continues to be used for agricultural purposes. 1987| 
59-2-505. Indicia of value for agricultural use 
assessment - Inclusion of fair market value on 
tax notice. 
If valuing land which qualifies as land actively! 
devoted to agricultural use under the test prescribed 
by Subsection 59-2-503(1), and for which the] 
owner has made a timely application for valuation 
assessment, and taxation under this part for the taxi 
year in issue, the assessor shall consider only those 
indicia of value which the land has for agricultural 
use as determined by the commission. The assessor 
shall also include the fair market value assessment 
on the tax notice. The county board of equalization! 
shall review the agricultural use value and fair 
market value assessments each year as provided) 
under Section 59-2-1001. 1987J 
59-2-506. Roll-back tax - Recordation - Lien 
- Computation of tax - Equalization, 
collection, and distribution. 
(1) If land which is or has been in agricultural! 
use, and is or has been valued, assessed, and taxed] 
under this part, is applied to a use other than agri 
cultural or is otherwise withdrawn from the provis 
ions of this part, it is subject to an additional taxi 
referred to as the "roll-back tax," and the owner| 
shall, within 90 days after the change in land use 
notify the county assessor of the change in land use 
and pay the roll-back tax. 
(2) Upon receipt of the notice, the county assessor! 
shall cause the following statement to be recorded! 
by the county recorder: "On ( date ) this land 
became subject to the roll-back tax imposed by 
Section 59-2-506." 
(3) The roll-back tax is a lien upon the land untii 
paid, and is due and payable at the time of the 
change in use. 
(4) The assessor shall determine the amount of the 
roll-back tax by computing the difference between 
the tax paid while the land was valued under thi<< 
part, and that which would have been paid had the 
property not been valued under this part. The 
county treasurer shall collect the roll-back tax and 
certify to the county recorder that the roll-back tax 
lien on the property has been satisfied. 
(5) The assessment of the roll-back tax imposed 
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by Subsection (1), the attachment of the 
these taxes, and the right of the owner 
interested party to review any judgmen 
county board of equalization affecting 
back tax, shall be governed by the proced 
vided for the assessment and taxation of i 
erty not valued, assessed, and taxed under 
The roll-back tax collected shall be paid 
county treasury and paid by the treasur 
various taxing units pro rata in accordanci 
levies for the current year. 
59-2-507. Exclusions from agricultural use 
assessment - Assessment of excluded stn 
and land. 
(1) Land under barns, sheds, silos, crit 
ouses and like structures, lakes, dam 
streams, and irrigation ditches and like 1 
included in determining the total area of 
vely devoted to agricultural use. Land 
under the farmhouse and land used in 
with the farmhouse, is excluded from tfu 
nation. 
(2) All structures which are located < 
agricultural use, the farmhouse and th 
which the farmhouse is located, and la 
connection with the farmhouse, shall 
assessed, and taxed using the same 
methods, and procedures that apply to oi 
structures and other land in the county. 
59-2-508. Application -Consent to audit i 
review - Purchaser's or lessee's affidav 
(1) Any application for valuation, asse 
taxation of land in agricultural use sh 
form prescribed by the commission, ai 
for the use of the applicants by the coui 
The application shall provide for the 
information pertinent to this part. A cei 
the owner that the facts set forth in th< 
are true may be prescribed by the comm 
of a sworn statement to that effect. S 
certified are considered as if made unc 
subject to the same penalties as provide 
perjury. 
(2) All owners applying for partici] 
this part and all purchasers or lessees J 
avits under Subsection (3) arc consid 
given their consent to field audit and re 
the commission and the county a 
consent is a condition to the accept 
application or affidavit. 
(3) Any owner of lands eligible f 
assessment, and taxation under this pj 
use of that land by, and the gross inc 
ations of, a purchaser or lessee, may 
lands by submitting, together with tl 
under Subsection (1), an affidavit fro 
aser or lessee certifying those facts i 
use of the land and the purchaser's oi 
income which would be necessary fo 
of those lands under this part. 
59-2-509. Change of ownership. 
Continuance of valuation, assessnr 
lion under this part depends upon c 
the land in agricultural use and comp 
other requirements of this part, and 
tinuance in the same owner of titli 
Liability to the roll-back tax attj 
change in use or other withdrawa 
occurs, but not when a change in o\ 
title takes place, if the new owner \ 
nues the land in agricultural use un 
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lessee obtains 80% or more of his income from agricultural products on an area 
of less than five contiguous acres. 
(3) The tax commission may grant a waiver of the income limitation for the 
tax year in issue, upon appeal by the owner and submission of proof that the land 
has been valued on the basis of agricultural use for at least two years immediately 
preceding that tax year, and that the failure to meet the income requirements for 
that tax year was due to no fault or act of the owner or a purchaser or lessee, 
whether that act is one of omission or commission. "Fault" shall not be construed 
to include the intentional planting of crops or trees which because of the 
maturation period of such crops or trees prevent the owner, purchaser, or lessee 
from achieving the income limitation. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-87, enacted by L. per year" in subsec. (1) for "gross income of 
1969, ch. 180, § 2; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 1; 1975, $250 per year"; substituted "at least two suc-
ch. 174, § 1. cessive years" for "at least five successive 
Compiler's Notes. years" in subsec. (1); redesignated former 
The 1975 amendment inserted the subsec- subd- <a> a s subsec- W> inserted "or a pur-
tion (1) designation; substituted "gross chaser or lessee" in subsec. (2); added subsec. 
income, not including rental income, of $1000 (3); and made minor changes in phraseology. 
59-5-89. Land actively devoted to agricultural use — Additional require-
ments — Application for assessment under act — Change in land use — Land 
used for religious or charitable purposes. Land which is actively devoted to agri-
cultural use is eligible for valuation, assessment and taxation each year it meets 
the following qualifications: 
(1) It has been so devoted for at least the two successive years immediately 
preceding the tax year for which valuation under this act is requested; 
(2) The area of land is not less than five contiguous acres when measured in 
accordance with the provisions of section 59-5-94, except where devoted to agricul-
tural use in conjunction with other eligible acreage, and when the gross sales of 
agricultural products produced thereon together with any payments received under 
a crop-land retirement program have averaged at least $1000 per year, not includ-
ing rental income, during the two year period immediately preceding the tax year 
in issue; and 
(3) (a) Application by the owner of the land for valuation hereunder is submit-
ted on or before January 1 of the tax year to the county assessor in which the 
land is situated on the form prescribed by the state tax commission. The county 
assessor shall continue to accept applications filed within 60 days after January 
1 upon payment of a late filing fee in the amount of $25, which shall be paid to 
the county treasurer. 
(b) The county assessor shall have all applications filed under subsection (a) 
recorded by the county recorder. All necessary filing fees shall be paid by the 
owner at the time his application is filed. Whenever land, which is or has been 
in agricultural use and is or has been valued, assessed and taxed under the provi-
sions of this act, is applied to a use other than agricultural, the owner shall, within 
90 days thereafter, notify the county assessor and pay the roll-back tax imposed 
by section 59-5-91. Upon receipt of notice, unless payment of the roll-back tax 
accompanies that notice, the county assessor shall cause the following statement 
to be recorded by the county recorder: "On the day of , 19 , 
this land became subject to the roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91." 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of (3)(a) and (b) of this section, whenever 
the owner of land has filed or becomes eligible for valuation under this act, he 
need not file again or give any notice to the county assessor until a change in the 
land use occurs. Failure of the owner to notify the county assessor and pay the 
roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91, within 90 days after any change in land 
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use, will subject the owner to a penalty of 100% of the computed roll-back tax 
due. 
(d) Any change in land use or other withdrawal of land from the provisions 
of this act shall be subject to the provisions of this section whether the change 
or withdrawal is voluntary or involuntary, unless the change in use is due to ineli-
gibility resulting solely from amendments to this act. 
(e) Land which becomes exempt from taxation as provided in section 59-2-30 
shall not be considered withdrawn from the provisions of this act as long as the 
land continues to be used for agricultural purposes. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-89, enacted by L. inserted "All necessary filing fees shall be 
1969, ch. 180, § 4; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 2; 1975, paid by the owner at the time his application 
ch. 174, § 2; 1982, ch. 68, § 1. \a filed" in subd. (3)(b); substituted "the 
Compiler's Notes. owner shall, within ninety days thereafter, 
The 1975 amendment reduced the land use n o t i fy the county assessor and pay the roll-
requirement in subd. (1) from five to two sue- Dac* tax imposed by section 59-5-91. Upon 
cessive years; inserted "except where devoted receipt of notice, unless payment of the roll-
to agricultural use in conjunction with other back tax accompanies that notice" in subd. 
eligible acreage" in subd. (2); substituted (3)(b) for "the owner shall notify the county 
"averaged at least $1000 per year, not includ- assessor"; inserted "and pay the roll-back tax 
ing rental income, during the two-year i m p o s e d by section 59-5-91, within ninety 
period in subd. (2) for averaged at least
 d „ . s u b d ( 3 ) ( } a d d e d s u b d ( 3 ) ( d ) a n d 
$250 per year during the five-year period J , . i. • i. i 
substituted "on or before January 1 of the m**e " c h a n g f i n P h f ?eoloey-
 u . 
tax year" for "on or before October 1 of the Th.e 19°2 amendment deleted as herein 
year immediately preceding the tax year" in provided" after "taxation" in the first sen-
the first sentence of subd. (3)(a) and "Janu- tence; added subd. (3)(e); and made minor 
ary 1" for "October 1" in the second sentence; changes in phraseology and style. 
59-5-90. "Indicia of value" for agricultural use determined by tax commis-
sion. The assessor in valuing land which qualifies as land actively devoted to agri-
cultural use under the test prescribed by this act, and as to which the owner 
thereof has made timely application for valuation, assessment and taxation hereun-
der for the tax year in issue, shall consider only those indicia of value which such 
land has for agricultural use as determined by the state tax commission. The 
county board of equalization shall review the assessments each year as provided 
in section 59-7-1. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-90, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1969, ch. 180, § 5; L. 1975, ch. 174, § 3. The 1975 amendment made no change in 
this section. 
59-5-92. "Roll-back tax" — Lien — Right to review judgment — Procedure. 
The assessment of the roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91, the attachment of 
the lien for such taxes, and the right of the owner or other interested party to 
review any judgment of the county board of equalization affecting such roll-back 
tax, shall be governed by the procedures provided for the assessment and taxation 
of real property not valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act. 
The roll-back tax collected shall be paid into the county treasury and paid by the 
treasurer to the various taxing units pro rata in accordance with the levies for 
the current year. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-92, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1969, ch. 180, § 7; L. 1975, ch. 174, § 4. The 1975 amendment made no change in 
this section. 
59-5-95. Application forms — Certification by landowner — Consent to 
audit and review — Purchaser's or lessee's affidavit. (1) Application for valua-
tion, assessment and taxation of land in agricultural use under this act shall be 
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Chapter 4. Privilege Tax 
59-4-101. Tax basis - Exceptions - Assessment and 
collection. 
59-4-102. Failure to pay tax - Remedies of county. 
59-4-101. Tax basis - Exceptions - Assessment 
and collection. 
(1) A tax is imposed on the possession or other 
beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or 
personal property which for any reason is exempt 
from taxation, if that property is used in connection 
with a business conducted for profit. 
(2) The tax imposed under this chapter is the same 
amount that the ad valorem property tax would be 
if the possessor or user were the owner of the pro-
perty. The amount of any payments which are made 
in lieu of taxes is credited against the tax imposed 
on the beneficial use of propety owned by the 
federal government. 
(3) No tax is imposed under this chapter on the 
following: 
(a) the use of property which is a concession in, 
or relative to, the use of a public airport, park, 
fairground, or similar property which is available as 
a matter of right to the use of the general public; 
(b) the use or possession of property by a reli-
gious, educational, or charitable organization; 
(c) the use or possession of property where the 
proceeds inure to the benefit of a religious, educat-
ional, or charitable organization and not to the 
benefit of any other person; 
(d) the possession or other beneficial use of 
public land occupied under the terms of a grazing 
lease or permit issued by the United States or this 
state; or 
(e) the use or possession of any lease, permit, 
or easement unless the lease, permit, or easement 
entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive posses-
sion of the premises to which the lease, permit, or 
easement relates. Every lessee, permittee, or other 
holder of a right to remove or extract the mineral 
covered by the holder's lease, right, permit, or 
easement except from brines of the Great Salt Lake, 
is considered to be in possession of the premises, 
notwithstanding the fact that other parties may have 
a similar right to remove or extract another mineral 
from the same lands or estates. 
(4) A tax imposed under this chapter is assessed to 
the possessors or users of the property on the same 
forms, and collected and distributed at the same 
time and in the same manner, as taxes assessed 
owners, possessors, or other claimants of property 
which is subject to ad valorem property taxation. 
The tax is not a lien against the property, and no 
tax-exempt property may be attached, encumbered, 
sold, or otherwise affected for the collection of the 
tax. 19*7 
59-4-102. Failure to pay tax - Remedies of 
county. 
A tax due and unpaid under this chapter constit-
utes a debt due the county for and on behalf of the 
various taxing units concerned with the tax. If the 
tax imposed by this chapter or any portion of the 
tax is not paid at the time the tax becomes delinq-
uent, the county auditor may issue a warrant in the 
name of the county directed to the clerk of the dis-
trict court for that county. The clerk shall enter in 
the judgment docket, in the column for judgment 
debtors, the name of the delinquent taxpayer men-
tioned in the warrant and, in the appropriate 
columns, the amount of tax, penalties, interest, and 
other costs for which the warrant is issued and the 
date when the warrant is filed. The warrant so 
docketed has the force and effect of a judgment 
duly rendered by a district court and docketed in the 
office of the clerk, and the county has the same 
remedies against the possessor or user as any other 
judgment creditor. im 
Chapter 5. Mining Occupation Tax 
59-5-101. Definitions. 
59-5-102. Occupation tax - Rate - Computation -
Annual exemption. 
59-5-103. Application to taxable years. 
59-5-104. Statements filed • Contents - Verification -
Falsification as perjury. 
59-5-105. Failure to file statement - Liability of owners 
of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon substances. 
59-5-106. Interest and penalty. 
59-5-107. Date tax due - Extensions • Installment 
payments • Penalty on delinquencies • Audit • Cost. 
59-5-108. Tax as lien on property or oil and gas 
production interests. 
59-5-109. Notice of amount of tax. 
59-5-110. (Effective through December 31, 1987). 
Hearings for correction of amount of tax. 
59-5-110. (Effective January 1, 1988). Adjudicative 
proceedings for correction of amount of tax. 
59-5-111. Decisions of commission. 
59-5-112. (Effective through December 31, 1987). 
Condition precedent to appeal to tax division of district 
court. 
59-5-112. (Effective January 1, 1988). Condition 
precedent to judicial review. 
59-5-113. Failure to pay tax - Warrant. 
59-5-114. Collection by warrant. 
59-5-115. Limitation of actions. 
59-5-116. Application of act to taxable years. 
59-5-117. Disposition of taxes collected • Credit to 
General Fund. 
59-5-118. Transfer of moneys in former occupation tax 
reserve fund. 
59-5-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) ''Person" includes any individual, partnership, 
company, joint stock company, corporation, asso-
ciation, or any group or combination acting as a 
unit, and the plural as well as the single number. 
(2) "Metalliferous minerals" is defined in Subse-
ction 59-2-102(4). 
(3) "Nonmetalliferous minerals" is defined in 
Subsection 59-2-102(7). 
(4) "Minerals" means either metalliferous or 
nonmetalliferous minerals, or both. 
(5) "Mine" is defined in Subsection 59-2-
102(5). 
(6) "Mining" is defined in Subsection 59-2-
102(6). 
(7) "Solid hydrocarbons" includes coal, gilsonite, 
ozocerite, elaterite, oil shale, tar sands, and all other 
hydrocarbon substances that occur naturally in solid 
form. 
(8) "Well or wells" means any well or wells or 
other extractive means from which oil, gas, or other 
hydrocarbon substances (except solid hydrocarbons) 
are produced or extracted, located within an oil field 
or gas field as defined in Subsection (9), and oper-
ated by one person. 
(9) "Oil field," or "gas field," means any field in 
which oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances 
(except solid hydrocarbons) are produced from one 
or more wells within an oil or gas structure, whether 
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jjjrec years. The current judicial council shall cont-
foue in existence with full authority until the election 
af the members of the council as provided m this 
section 
(2) The appellate court nominating commission 
established by Subsection 20-1-7 2(1) may not be 
eonvened initially prior to July 1, 1986 nor later 
jjmit September 1, 1986 
(3) The provisions in this act for court jurisdict-
ions may not be implemented until January I, 1987 
Courts then continue to have jurisdiction to dispose 
of any cases pending on that date 
(4)(a) Any justice or judge of a court of record, 
those election to office was effective on or before 
July 1, 1985, shall hold the office for the remainder 
of the term to which he was elected. The justice or 
judge is subject to an unopposed retention election 
is provided by law at the general election lmmedi-
itely preceding the expiration of the respective term 
of office 
(b) Any justice or judge of a court of record 
whose appointment to office was effective on or 
before July 1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed 
retention election as provided by law at the first 
general election held more than three years after the 
date of the appointment 
(c) Any justice or judge of a court of record 
whose appointment to office was effective after July 
I, 1985, is subject to an unopposed retention elec-
tion as provided by law at the first general election 
held more than three years after the date of the 
tppomtment i9«6 
Chapter 2. Supreme Court 
U-2-1. Number of justices - Term - Retirement -
Chief justice and associate chief justice - Selection and 
functions 
ft-M.5. Repealed. 
&-2-1 6. Repealed. 
U-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987). Supreme 
Court jurisdiction. 
fc-2-2 (Effective January 1, 1988) Supreme Court 
jurisdiction 
&-2-3. Repealed. 
Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges pro 
I tempore, and practice of law. 
**2-5. Court always open for transaction of business. 
Appellate court administrator. 
£^7 through 78-2-10. Repealed. 
JM1. Reporter - Deputy clerks - Assistants. 
J**12 Postage and office supplies. 
J&M3. Bailiffs and assistant librarian. 
*M-14. Sheriffs to attend and serve. 
£•1. Number of justices - Term -
irement - Chief justice and associate chief 
ice - Selection and functions. 
fl) The Supreme Court consists of five justices 
•) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be app-
H^fcd initially to serve until the first general elec-
§ ° n held more than three years after the effective 
?*? of the appointment Thereafter, the term of 
«<* of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years 
^
 until his successor is appointed and approved in 
t ordance with Section 20-1-7.1. 
U*j The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a 
t ^ Justice from among the members of the court 
| J * majority vote of all justices. The term of the 
L j * of chief justice is four years The chief justice 
r j * n°t serve successive terms. The chief justice 
|JJ* resign from the office of chief justice without 
•^mng from t n e supreme Court . The chief justice 
•8g? 
Code 78-2-2, 
may be removed from the office of chief justice by 
a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice 
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the ass-
ociate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a 
chief justice is elected under this section If the 
associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act 
as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a 
member of the Supreme Court , the chief justice has 
additional duties as provided by law 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief 
justice. The term of office of the associate chief 
justice is two years. The associate chief justice may 
serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms The associate chief justice shall be elected by 
a majonty vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief 
justice decides. If the chief justice is absent or oth-
erwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice 
shall serve as chief justice. The chief justice, where 
not inconsistent with law, may delegate responsibi-
lities to the associate chief justice 19W 
78-2-1.5. Repealed. 1971 
78-2-1.6. Repealed. i98i 
78-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987). 
Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary wnts and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its 
jurisdiction 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals pnor to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating 
in: 
(0 the Public Service Commission; 
(H) the State Tax Commission; 
(m) the Board of State Lands, 
(IV) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mimng, and 
(v) the state engineer; 
( 0 a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or this 
state unconstitutional on its face under the Consti-
tution of the United States or the Utah Constitu-
tion, 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and 
(l) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters* 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
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(b) election and voting contests, 
(c) reapportionment of election districts, 
(d) retention or removal of public officers, 
(e) general water adjudication, 
( 0 taxation and revenue, and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) 
through (h) 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, 
but the Supreme Court shall review those cases 
certified to it bv the Court of Appeals under Subs-
ection (3)(b) 1986 
78-2-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). Supreme 
Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified bv a court of 
the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carr> into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its 
jurisdiction 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of mterlocutorv appeals, over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawyers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission, 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating 
in 
d) the Public Service Commission, 
(u) the State Tax Commission, 
(in) the Board of State Lands, 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and 
(v) the state engineer, 
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or this 
state unconstitutional on its tace under the Consti-
tution of the United States or the Utah Constitu-
tion, 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a cnarge of a first degree or capital 
felon>, 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and 
(0 orders, judgments, and decrees of anv court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the 
SuDreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions, 
(b) election and voting contests, 
(c) reapportionment of election districts, 
(d) retention or removal of public officers, 
(e) general water adjudication, 
(0 taxation and revenue, and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) 
through (h) 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, 
but tne Supreme Court shall review those cases 
certified to it bv the Court of Appeals under Subs-
ection (3)(b) 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review 
of agency adjudicative proceedings 1987 
78-2-3 . Repealed. im 
78-2-4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of pro-
cedure and evidence for use in the courts of the 
state and shall bv rule manage the appellate process 
The Legislature mav amend the rules of procedure 
and evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a 
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah 
Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule ma> aut-
horize retired justices and judges and judges pro 
tempore to perform any judicial duties Judges pro 
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah 
residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted 
to the practice of law 1986 
78-2-5. Court always open for transaction of 
business . 
The Supreme Court shall alwavs be open for the 
transaction of business Adjournments from day to 
day, or from time to time, are to be construed as 
recesses in the sessions, and shall not prevent the 
court from sitting at any time 1953 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the opera-
tion of the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals The duties of the clerks and support staff 
shall be established bv the appellate court adminis-
trator, and powers established bv rule of the 
Supreme Court 1986 
78-2-7 through 78-2-10. Repealed . 19*6 
78-2-11 . Reporter - Deputv clerks - Assistants. 
The Supreme Court shall appoint a reporter of its 
decisions who shal' hold office during the pleasure 
of the court, and may appoint, remove at pleasure, 
and fix the compensation for such deputy clerks and 
other assistants as may be necessary for the transa-
ction of the business of tne court 1953 
78-2-12. Pos tage and office suppl ies . 
S ta t ionery , postage and supplies necessarv for the 
transaction of the business of the Supreme Court, 
including the printing of the court docket, shall be 
furnished by the purchasing department or officer 
of the state, on requisition therefor made through 
the clerk 1953 
78-2-13. Bailiffs and assistant librarian. 
The court is herebv authorized to appoint and 
remove at pleasure the necessary bailiffs to attend 
the court, and to perform such other duties and 
execute such orders as may be directed or made by 
the court The court may also appoint and remove 
at pleasure an assistant librarian, who shall perform 
such duties as the court may order or direct 1953 
78-2-14. Shenffs to attend and serve. 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of anv sheriff in the state 1953 
Chapter 2a. Court of Appeals 
78-2a-l Court of Appeals 
78-2a-2 Number of judges - Functions - Filing fees. 
78-2a-3 (Effective through December 31, 1987) Court 
of Appeals jurisdiction 
78-2a-3 (EffecUve Januan 1, 1988) Court of Appeals 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION* 
THOMAS E. & MARY LU E. JUDD, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
DECISION OF 
) INFORMAL HEARING 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, : Appeal No. 85-1738 thru 
STATz. OF UTAH, ) 85-1750 
: Serial No. See attachment 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter was appealed from the Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization's determination not to place the subject 
property on greenbelt status. A hearing was held on the matter 
on March 26, 1986 before the Utah State Tax Commission. James 
E. Harvard, Hearing Officer, heard the matter for the Utah 
State Tax Commission. Thomas E. Judd was present, and the Salt 
Lake County Board of Equalization was represented by Bill 
Thomas Peters, Jona Schomburg, Craig Jacobsen and Colleen 
Jacobsen. Also present on behalf of the Respondent was 3ob 
Yates. 
Petitioner presented evidence that lots 4 through 16 
of the Vista West Subdivision, although platted, are still 
being used as farm ground. The lots approximately 4 acres, are 
farmed in conjunction with a larger 19 acre piece which lies to 
tr.e east of the subject property. The property brings in 
approximately $300.00 an acre per year based on the hay and 
grain produced from the property. The Petitioner asserts that 
where the use of the property has not changed even though it 
has, in fact, been subdivided or platted for subdivision, that 
the roll back taxes should not be assessed, nor should the 
prDperty be taken off greenbelt status. 
The property is improved with curb, gutter, streets, 
telephone service, sewer, and electricity. The back lot lines 
are presently established by the telephone company's service 
boxes and stubbed in electrical wiring. All of the utilities 
are underground. 
During the construction of the improvements, the 
contractor deposited debris and other property on the subject 
lots making it difficult to farm the property. Thus, the 
property was not farmed for approximately 2 years. A claim was 
filed for destruction to the crops on the property, or crops 
which would have been grown had the debris, etc. had not been 
on the property. 
The Respondent presented evidence that the greenbelt 
status of the property no longer applies, and the roil back 
-2-
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taxes should be imposed. The basis for their conclusions were 
that the curb and gutter had been in place and all improvements 
had been put in. In addition, the lets in their present 
condition are weed infested, and have not been cultivated. In 
addition to this fact, it would also be very difficult to get 
the machinery into the property to do any cultivating due to 
the stubbed in electrical work and the teiphone lines along the 
back lot line of the property. 
DECISION AMD ORDER 
3ased upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission makes the 
ft 1 lowing determinations: 
1. The subject property has been severed from the 
larger 19 acre piece to the east. 
2. The severance was accomplished by the platting of 
the property, the construction and installation of the 
utilities, curb, street, and gutter etc. 
3. Once property has been severed, subdivided, and 
improvements placed thereon, the greenbelt status should be 
removed and roll back taxes assessed according to statute 
because the primary purpose of the ground is no longer for 
agricultural use, but for resale. The current economic 
conditions, the inability to sell lots, and continued limited 
farming activity on the property are incidental to the primary 
purpose of the marketing and sales of the subdivided, platted, 
and improved lots. 
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DEC ISION AND ORDER 
Therefore, it is the Decision and Order of the Tax 
Commission that the Petitioner's petition be denied and that 
the actions of the Salt Lake County Assessor be affirmed. 
DATED this , x^ day of Cj^ypy^ J. . 1986. 
3Y ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COM^fsSION. 
y.c-rk K 3uchi /R. H. Hansen 
Chairman Commissioner 
, Joe 3. Pacheco 
Cc.T.iss ioner Commiss ioner 
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